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Abstract
This article details the conception, design, development and analysis of invisible, blind and robust color image
watermarking algorithms based on the wavelet transform. Using error correcting codes, the watermarking algorithms
are designed to be robust against intentional or unintentional attacks such as JPEG compression, additive white
Gaussian noise, low pass ﬁlter and color attacks (hue, saturation and brightness modiﬁcations). Considering the
watermarking channel characterized by these attacks, repetition, Hamming, Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem and
Reed-Solomon codes are used in order to improve the robustness using diﬀerent modes and appropriate decoding
algorithms. The article compares the eﬃciency of diﬀerent type of codes against diﬀerent type of attacks. To the best
of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst time that the eﬀect of error-correcting codes against diﬀerent attacks are detailed in a
watermarking context in such a precise way: describing and comparing the eﬀect of diﬀerent classes of codes against
diﬀerent type of attacks. This article clearly shows that list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes using the algorithm of
Sudan exhibits good performance against hue and saturation attacks. The use of error correcting codes in a
concatenation mode allows the non-binary block codes to show good performance against JPEG compression,
noise and brightness attacks.
1 Introduction
Watermarking provides a possible solution to ensure and
safeguard copyright and intellectual property rights for
online multimedia content. The watermarking of color
images raises the issues of robustness against intentional
or unintentional attacks; the invisibility with respect to
the human visual system (HVS); the maximum allowable
information that can be inserted into the image and the
security of the watermark. The watermarking algorithms
must be designed in order to cater for these requirements.
In this article, we will discuss and propose eﬀective solu-
tions for the issue of robustness related to color image
watermarking.
Robustness to intentional attacks is a main issue for
color image watermarking where the inserted watermark
can be removed or manipulated to such an extent that the
attribution of a watermark to a particular individual or
image is diﬃcult or impossible. The robustness of water-
marking algorithms can also be aﬀected by unintentional
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attacks which can result from a change in color space or
common signal distortions.
The watermarking problem is considered analogous to
the transmission of a signal over a noisy channel and the
underlying characteristics of the channel are deﬁned by
the diﬀerent attacks. Error correcting codes have been
widely used to protect the signature (identiﬁcation of a
buyer/seller or transaction) of an image for watermarking
applications. The robustness performance of our wavelet
based watermarking algorithm (presented in Section 2),
which uses the relation between wavelet color coeﬃcients,
is enhanced with the help of error correcting codes. The
robustness improvement against attacks such as JPEG
compression, additive white Gaussian noise, low pass ﬁl-
tering and color attacks (hue, saturation and brightness
modiﬁcations) is demonstrated using diﬀerent families
and modes of error correcting codes. We explore and
demonstrate the use and eﬀectiveness of the concate-
nation of repetition codes, Hamming codes and BCH
codes to enhance the robustness of the watermarking
algorithm. Reed-Solomon codes are also used in a stan-
dalone manner using list decoding algorithm of Sudan
[1] to correct errors resulting from attacks which can
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induce burst errors. Generally watermarking algorithms
use bounded distance decoding algorithms for diﬀer-
ent error correcting codes along with the concatenation
of these codes with each other [2-5]. We compare the
performance of list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes
with bounded distance decoding algorithms of repetition,
Hamming, BCH, and the concatenation of these codes.
Relatively recent developments [1,6] in the ﬁeld of error
correcting codes, for decoding Reed-Solomon codes, have
made it possible to correct errors beyond the conven-
tionally used bounded distance algorithms. As code rates
tends towards 0, the list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes
shows asymptotic improvement in performance over the
bounded distance algorithms. As generally [5,7,8] the
codes rates for watermarking schemes rates are very low,
we can therefore employ this asymptotic improvement to
our advantage.
These diﬀerent error correcting codes exhibit diﬀerent
performance when the watermarked image is attacked. As
the image and the attack have diﬀerent characteristics we
give the best error correcting code against the diﬀerent
types of attacks. We intend to ﬁnd out the relationship
between the diﬀerent attack types and the protection pro-
vided by the error correcting codes. Our main focus in
the robustness analysis is to provide suitable countermea-
sures against color attacks. Detailed analysis is carried out
for the robustness issue against the attacks under consid-
eration using the diﬀerent modes and families of the error
correcting codes.
Moreover, as watermarking algorithms do not usually
consider color attacks and counter measures to protect
the color images against such attacks have not been
explored in earlier study. One of the objectives of this
article is to study color attacks and propose adequate
robustness measures.
In this study, our contribution is twofold. We ﬁrst pro-
pose in Section 2, a wavelet based color image watermark-
ing algorithm, with enhanced invisibility. The insertion is
intended to keep the watermark invisible and the blind
detection is performed without using the original (unwa-
termarked) image. In Section 3, we present the error
correcting codes along with their use in the watermarking
process. The last section studies the eﬀectiveness of the
codes against diﬀerent types of attack.
2 Color image watermarking algorithm based on
the wavelet transform
In this section, we want to describe the design of invisi-
ble color image watermarking schemes in terms of human
perception of change and image quality degradation pro-
posed by the authors. After, we also intend to improve the
robustness performance of invisible color image water-
marking algorithms so that such algorithms can resist
intentional or unintentional attacks.
To cater for the requirements of invisibility and robust-
ness, watermarking techniques employ the spatial and
transform domains [9-13]. In general, the insertion of the
watermark in the spatial domain has low complexity but
also low robustness to attacks originating from the trans-
form domains, such as JPEG compression, or for example
median ﬁltering. We could choose the band of frequen-
cies in the multiresolution domain, thus giving us more
control as to where to place the watermark. It is also
important to note that these algorithms also diﬀer in other
aspects such as the way the watermark is prepared and
inserted.
This article deals withe transform domain water-
marking algorithm. Such algorithms employ discrete
Fourier transform (DFT) [14-17], discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT) [18-21], discrete wavelet transform (DWT)
[22-27] and the contourlet transform (CT) [8] to insert
the watermark with the best compromise between the
invisibility, robustness and capacity criteria.
It is known that robustness against image distortion is
enhanced if the watermark is placed in perceptually sig-
niﬁcant parts of the image. This contrasts with one of the
requirements of an invisible watermarking algorithm, the
embedded watermark should be invisible to the human
visual system (HSV).Watermarking techniques have to be
developed taking into account the masking properties of
the HVS. Some characteristics of the HVS with respect
to watermarking are highlighted in the literature [28,29].
These characteristics include frequency sensitivity, that is
the diﬀerence sensitivity of the human eye to sine wave
gratings at diﬀerent frequencies; luminance sensitivity,
that is the diﬀerent sensitivity of the eye to a noise signal
on a constant background, depending on the average value
of the background luminance and on the level of the noise
luminance; and contrast masking, which refers to the per-
ception of a signal in presence of a masking stimulus, and
which depends on the relative spatial frequency, location
and orientation. For example, an approach [30] based on
the Fourier transform insists that interoperability between
the HVSmodel and the watermark embeddingmay not be
optimal and the DCT and DWT domains do not allow the
implementation of a suitable HVS model. Another impor-
tant observation is that the CSF is not adapted to predict
invisibility for complex signals such as natural images,
essentially because the HVS is modeled by a single chan-
nel. Based on psychovisual experiments, they have derived
a perceptual channel decomposition (PCD).
The algorithm presented during the course of this study
is based on the wavelet transform. In the case of the DFT
any change in the transform coeﬃcients aﬀects the entire
image but in the case of the wavelet transform we have
the additional spatial description of the image. Another
great advantage is that we can adapt the watermark inser-
tion according to the local image information. The DCT is
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non adaptive to the image as the diﬀerent levels of infor-
mation could not be extracted and only the frequency
information is present. Whereas transform domains such
as the DWT map an image into the spatial-temporal
domain. As a typical natural image is dominated by low
frequency components, the energy concentration in cor-
responding coeﬃcients could be eﬃciently exploited to
insert the watermark. Those low frequencies represent
the overall shapes and outlines of features in the image,
and its luminance and contrast characteristics. High fre-
quencies represent sharpness in the image, but contribute
little spatial-frequency energy. The main advantage of the
DWT and the CT is that we can choose the band of
frequencies and the spatial and frequential combinations
which are most suitable to carry the watermark. Our later
discussion will be limited to the DWT.
The watermarking algorithms discussed, designed and
implemented in this article belong to the class of blind
algorithms [12,19,31-44] which means that (unlike the
non-blind watermarking algorithms [45,46]) the originally
image is not consulted at the time of the detection or
decoding of the watermark.
One can mention mainly three insertion methods, each
of them can be applied on pixels in the spatial domain,
or on coeﬃcients in any transform domain: LSB mod-
iﬁcation, Spread Spectrum and the Quantization Index
Modulation. One such invisible watermarking algorithm
uses LSB modiﬁcations of any color or grey-scale image
[9]. The algorithm uses m-sequences due to their good
auto-correlation properties and pseudo-random nature.
The algorithm embeds the m-sequence on the LSB of
the image. The watermark is decoded by comparing the
LSB bit pattern with a stored counterpart. The Spread
Spectrum techniques are well known in Communications
for their low SNR operations. A message bit is “spread”
using a pseudo-random unit vector. To decode, a scalar
correlation is computed and the ﬁnal decision is com-
puted with a maximum likelihood decision rule. Lastly,
the quantization index modulation is a generalization
of LSB embedding. At each position, the quantizer Qi
is selected according to the message value m = i. To
decode, the distances between the signal value and all
the quantizer are computed and the smallest distance is
selected.
The wavelet based color image watermarking algorithm
presented in this Section is used to test the robustness
improvement achieved by the incorporation of the dif-
ferent modes and families of error correcting codes. The
signature is the information we want to embed into the
image, it identiﬁes uniquely the person who intends to
watermark the image or a transaction. The watermark is
the information that we actually embed into the image,
it could be the same as the signature, or it could be pro-
cessed. In our case, we pass the signature through an
encoding procedure to make the watermark robust and
invisible.
2.1 The watermark construction
The initial matrix or the signature is constructed by a ran-
dom number generator according to the user speciﬁed
parameters. After we apply the encoding scheme to con-
struct the watermark which is then embedded into the
image with certain limitations depending on image size
and user deﬁned parameters. The signature size is chosen
to be 8 × 8 as it corresponds to a compromise between a
suﬃcient size for a copyright application and a minimum
robustness.
In the literature, we have many options to construct
the ﬁnal watermark from the initial matrix. For the pur-
pose of illustration let us consider the very basic encoding
scheme—the repetition codes. This signature or the initial
matrix is repeated four times into an intermediate matrix
which is again repeated according to the image capacity.
The human visual system is sensitive to changes in
the lower frequencies as they are associated to the more
signiﬁcant characteristics of the image. The higher fre-
quencies give the details of the image but changes in the
higher frequencies could be easily eliminated by a low pass
ﬁlter. Therefore the proposed algorithm uses middle fre-
quencies for the insertion of the mark as both invisibility
and robustness against low pass ﬁlter attacks is required
in such an algorithm.
2.2 Wavelet decomposition
The wavelet decomposition is applied to each color com-
ponent R, G, and B. The wavelet decomposition gives us
the decomposition of the signal into diﬀerent frequency
bands. This decomposition is done by a ﬁlter bank in
such a way that we split the low frequency band into
small segments in order to separate all the components
of the signal and we split the higher frequency bands
into large segments as they contain less information. We
embed the mark into middle frequencies as the higher fre-
quencies could be simply eliminated by a low pass ﬁlter
and the lower frequencies carry the overall form of the
image and changing these lower frequenciesmaymake the
watermark visible.
2.3 Vector deﬁnition
The wavelet decomposition gives us the wavelet coef-
ﬁcients to the level/scale L associated to a middle fre-
quency band. From these coeﬃcients the vectors are
deﬁned
( Va[ n,m] )0<(n,m)< N2L . (1)
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Such that,
Va[ n,m] = {da1,L[ n,m] , da2,L[ n,m] , da3,L[ n,m] }. (2)
With a = {R,G,B}, [ n,m] representing the coordinates,
and (dj,L)j=1,2,3 the sub-bands of the wavelet decomposi-
tion at the Lth level, as shown in Figure 1. The top right
side of the Figure 1 (after wavelet decomposition) cor-
responds to the result of a low pass operation and the
corresponding detail bands generated by the sub band
ﬁltering operation for the red color component. This
process is repeated for each of the following wavelet
decompositions until we reach the Lth level where we
are interested to insert the watermark. Then the vec-
tors are deﬁned for each of the color component. The
bottom part of Figure 1 shows the vector deﬁnition for
the red color component at scale L = 1 and position
[ n,m]. Here (d1,L) (resp., (d2,L) and (d3,L)) corresponds
to the horizontal (resp., vertical and diagonal) details of
the image.
The maximum information (capacity) that can be
embedded using the watermarking scheme is calculated
using Dx2L ∗
Dy
2L , where Dx and Dy are the horizontal and
vertical dimensions of the image and L is the level of the
wavelet decomposition where we are interested to insert
the watermarkM.
2.4 Watermark insertion
In order to deﬁne the insertion process, we propose to
adapt the QIM principle to vectorial case. For this, we will
introduce a modiﬁcation rule of color wavelet coeﬃcients.
As we have said theQIMuses a quantizer that is a function
that maps a value to the nearest point belonging to a class
of pre-deﬁned discontinuous points. For non-adaptive
QIM, the quantization step size is independent of the con-
tent. However, it is well known that the ability to perceive
a change depends on the content. For example, the HVS is
much less sensitive to changes in heavily textured regions
and much more sensitive to changes in uniform regions.
Moreover, the coeﬃcient modiﬁcations and QIM process
pose some challenges when applied generally to the color
domain.
To account for this, we propose to use a method to auto-
matically adapt the quantization step size at each sample.
First, the step value is controlled by the wavelet coeﬃ-
cients that measure the spatial local activity. Second, the
watermark insertion process is based upon moving one
of the three color vectors (R, G, andB). A better candi-
date is deﬁned in order to minimize the distortion at each
insertion space.
Figure 1 Vector deﬁnition. Deﬁnition of a vector VR[ n,m] from the wavelet coeﬃcients at scale L = 1 and for the red component at position [ n,m].
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For each coordinate, we have to deﬁne one vector VM
that denotes the vector to be watermarked, and two ref-
erence vectors Vvref1 and Vvref2. VM, Vvref1, and Vvref2
are selected with respect of the correspondence to the
following equations
‖Pref1 − Pref2‖2 = max
(a,b)∈{R,G,B}a=b
‖Pa − Pb‖2; PM = Pc.
(3)
With c ∈ {R,G,B}, c = a and c = b
Figure 2 shows that Pref1 and Pref2 are the most dis-
tant points from each pair of points and that is why PR is
chosen as PM. Here Px refers to the extreme point of the
vector Vx. PM corresponds to VM which is marked with
the contents of the watermarking matrixM.
The watermarking convention is presented in Figure 3,
where the watermarked vector VM,W , that corresponds to
the original vector VM.
After watermarking, if VM denotes VR, then:
• ifM[ n,m]= 0, then VR,W [ n,m] will be nearer toVG[ n,m] than VB[ n,m],
• else VR,W [ n,m] will be nearer to VB[ n,m] thanVG[ n,m].
One of the most important possibilities lies on the abil-
ity of tuning the PM,W shift in order to limit the visual
degradations on the image. Figure 4 shows the possible
shifts of PM,W . Two cases are considered, Shift 1 and
Shift 2. The limit of the two possible modiﬁcations is the
median line between Pref1 and Pref2. To be more robust,
we deﬁne around this line a particular area (Figure 4) such
that after the watermarking if PM,W is in this area, it has to
be moved out by increasing the strength of the insertion
process. The border of this area can be equivalent to ±5%
of the distance between Pref1 and Pref2.
With this approach, there exist two cases of Shift. In the
ﬁrst case, PM is already nearest to Pref1 and the possible
positions of PM,W after watermarking belongs to the seg-
ment PMPref1 (if PM is out of the median area). In the
Figure 2 Aﬀectation. Example of name vector aﬀectation, function
of their position from each other.
Figure 3Watermarking convention. Example of watermarking
convention.
second case, PM is not already nearest to Pref1 and we
create an intermediate point Pint, deﬁned by:
• PMPint is parallel to Pref1Pref2,
• Pint is located at the border of the median area (the
distance between Pint and the median line must be
equivalent to 5% of the distance between Pref1 and
Pref2).
Then, the possible positions of PM,W belongs to the seg-
ment PintPref1. For the Case 1, where PM is the initial point
of PM,W , and for the Case 2, where Pint is the initial point
of PM,W , the watermark is deﬁned by:
VM,W [ n,m] = Vreﬁ[ n,m]
− (1 − Fa[ n,m] ).( Vreﬁ − VS[ n,m] ),
(4)
where i = {1, 2}, a = {R,G,B}, 0 ≤ Fa[ n,m]≤ 1,
S = {M; int} and Fa represents the weighted matrix for
watermarking for each location [ n,m].
• If Fa[ n,m]= 0, the force of insertion is minimum.
• If Fa[ n,m]= 1, the force of insertion is maximum
and PM,W is superposed on Preﬁ.
Figure 4Modiﬁcation. Possible positions of PM,W .
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In the case of maximum force of insertion Fa = 1, a
conﬂict problem is highlighted, as shown on Figure 3 with
a circle. It is observed that the bit value between PR and PB
can be diﬀerent:M can receive 0 or 1. This means that, in
the detection step, the vector identiﬁcation (VR, VR, and
VR to VM, Vref1, and Vref2) could be false. Thus, to avoid
this conﬁguration, Fa must be set inferior to 1.
The modiﬁcation operation is applied on the whole host
image in the wavelet domain. The last step in the water-
mark insertion process is the reconstruction of the image
in to the spatial domain by inverse wavelet transform.
2.5 Watermark extraction
The ﬁrst step of the extraction process consists also in a
decomposition of the image with the same wavelet basis
used in the insertion step. The watermarkMD is detected
by measuring the largest distance between || Vvref1 − VM||
and || Vvref2 − VM||. Following the convention used in
insertion, the watermark is thus reconstructed, bit by bit.
The signature SD is obtained by making an average and a
binarization that corresponds to the coding method used
for the creation of themarkM. In order to decide if SD cor-
responds to S, a threshold is ﬁxed to accept an extracted
signature. This threshold is based on the acceptable level
of bit error rate for the watermarking system.
Based on this we can deﬁne an acceptance threshold
which decides as to whether to accept the detected water-
mark or to reject it. The diﬀerent modes and families
of error correcting codes, discussed in Section 3 help
to lower this acceptance threshold, thus increasing the
robustness of the watermarking scheme.
3 How to improve robustness with error
correcting codes
Lots of research has been carried out to improve the
robustness of a watermarked image where the use of error
correcting codes to protect the signature is the most high-
lighted [2-5]. The watermarking problem is synonymous
to the transmission of a signal over a noisy channel, where
the image is considered to be the channel, the attacks are
considered to be noise signals and the signature is consid-
ered to be the signal to be transmitted in the form of the
watermark.
This section deals with the investigation of the perfor-
mance capabilities of diﬀerent error correcting schemes
employed for a digital color image watermarking applica-
tion based on the discrete wavelet transform. We worked
on improving the robustness of the signature with the
help of four families of error correcting codes. These four
families of error correcting codes give diﬀerent response
when tested against diﬀerent attacks on watermarked
images. This is so because each of the attacks modiﬁes
the watermarked image in a diverse way and the proper-
ties exhibited by the error correcting codes are diﬀerent
against diﬀerent error types (burst errors or random
errors). To counter this problem we have employed rep-
etition codes (presented at the ﬁrst section), Hamming
codes [47], Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH) codes
[48] and Reed-Solomon codes [49].
In the literature diﬀerent types of error correcting
schemes for the watermarking problem are proposed. For
example since 1998 Wang et al. use Hamming codes [50],
Perreira et al. study the BCH codes for watermarking
applications [51], some were hybrids between for example
BCH and repetition codes [4]. Finally, some articles sug-
gest using convolutional codes for watermarking [52,53].
Some compared diﬀerent types of coding schemes, e.g.,
Reed Solomon, BCH and repetition codes [3].
What makes our study original is that we describe and
compare the eﬀect of diﬀerent classes of codes against
diﬀerent type of real image attacks, we include diﬀerent
codes and the list decoding scheme in a color water-
marking complete process. With this study, we propose
to describe the errors introduced by diﬀerent attacks and
thus to illustrate the connection of a particular attack
with a particular error correcting scheme in the context of
our color wavelet algorithm. Since, there is a relationship
between the contents of an image and the error nature
attack, the result section analyzes the diﬀerent results with
empirical observation and provides intuitive explanations.
We adopted a rigorous testing process where we tested
the robustness of diﬀerent watermarked images with mul-
tiple signatures. We employed some standard attacks
which include color attacks, ﬁltering attacks, noise attacks
and image compression attacks. The scheme had already
been tested against some of these attacks with the use
of repetition codes [5]. It proved to be robust against
these attacks to a certain extent. We wished to explore the
eﬀectiveness of other error correcting codes against these
attacks.
The diﬀerent error correcting codes are tested using
the wavelet based color image watermarking scheme pre-
sented in Section 2. Then using some possible attacks
the robustness obtained using the diﬀerent families and
modes of error correcting codes is shown and the results
are presented in Section 4.
3.1 Characteristics of the watermarking channel
Due to the requirement of watermark invisibility, the
watermarks are weakly inserted in to the image. This
makes the watermark signal prone to errors or attacks.
The watermark channel is very noisy due to the diﬀer-
ent types of intentional or unintentional attacks. We
consider the problem of watermark robustness against
diﬀerent errors or attacks analogous to the transmission
of a signal over a noisy channel. To correctly transmit
a signal over a noisy channel error correcting codes are
used to protect the signal from the eﬀects of the channel.
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The characteristics of the watermarking channel depend
upon the type of attacks experienced by the watermarked
image. Like in the transmission of a signal over a noisy
channel, error correcting codes are used to protect the
signature in the form of a watermark so that the eﬀects
of the channel are reduced or minimized. The underlying
characteristics of an image, e.g., the texture and color
information also determine the eﬀect an attack has on the
watermarked image. The watermarking algorithm and
the type and mode of error correcting codes also play an
important role in deﬁning the combined performance of
robustness and invisibility.
The characteristics of the watermarking channel are pri-
marily determined by the diﬀerent attacks. We consider
JPEG compression, additive white Gaussian noise, low
pass ﬁlter, hue, saturation, and brightness as the underly-
ing characteristics of the watermarking channel. Each of
the diﬀerent error correcting codes presented in the fol-
lowing Section exhibit diﬀerent properties against these
attacks.
The watermarking channel is characterized by very
high error rates. To correct these errors we use diﬀer-
ent error correction schemes. Four families of error cor-
recting schemes are used in our study to enhance the
robustness of the watermark—repetition codes, Hamming
codes, BCH codes and Reed-Solomon codes. We explore
the use and eﬀectiveness of the concatenation of these dif-
ferent families of error correcting codes to enhance the
robustness of the watermarking scheme.
We employ a concatenation model where two of these
error correcting codes are concatenated so that the two
error correcting codes can facilitate one another. The
outer error correcting codes are a second version of the
repetition codes: the watermark is built up from some rep-
etitions of the signature. The outer error help in reducing
the error rates so that the inner error correcting codes
(repetition, Hamming, or BCH) could then further reduce
the errors so that the decision that the received watermark
is valid or not could be taken.
Error correcting codes are expressed in the following
article in the form of (n, k, d), where n is the length of the
code, k is the dimension and d is the minimum Hamming
distance between any pair of diﬀerent codewords. The
Hamming distance, Hd is based on the Hamming weight
of a codeword c given by Hw(c), the number of non zero
elements in a vector. The Hamming distance Hd between
two codewords is the number of elements in which they
diﬀer. The minimum Hamming distance d, between any
two diﬀerent codewords deﬁnes the error correcting capa-
bility of the particular error correcting code. An (n, k, d)
error correcting code is capable of correcting t errors
where t < d2 .
3.2 Concatenated error correcting codes
As we have said, the robustness of the watermarking
scheme could be improved by concatenating these codes
using signature repetition codes as outer codes and bit
repetition, Hamming or BCH codes as inner codes. The
outer coding is adaptive and is in accordance to the size
of the image and user parameters, it is always repetition
coding as shown in Figure 5.
At the receiver side an exact opposite procedure is
applied to decode the signature from the watermark, i.e.,
we decode the watermark using repetition decoding ﬁrst
and then we decode the resulting information using rep-
etition, Hamming or BCH decoding and we have the
signature.
Such a concatenation mode has been selected because
error correcting codes cannot display their potential
unless the error rate induced by the channel is reduced
below a critical value which brings about the possibility
of ﬁrst improving the channel error rate via repetition
coding to an acceptable level, before any further decod-
ing. The watermark channel may have to operate at very
high bit error rates and codes such as BCH stop bring-
ing in any advantage while the repetition codes continue
with their modest protection. However concatenation of
repetition and BCH codes is a way to improve the decod-
ing performance when the error rates are high [3]. The
BCH codes can correct up to t = (d − 1)/2	 errors,
all errors exceeding t may cause the decoder to decode
erroneously. The repetition codes display better charac-
teristics than BCH under high error rates. This could be
seen in Section 4.2 (noise attack) where the repetition
codes performmuch better than the BCH (63,16,23) codes
when the SNR < 2.
As mentioned in the introduction Reed-Solomon codes
are used in a standalone mode to correct burst errors.
Figure 5 Concatenation model. Coding model of the concatenation codes.
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The decoding of Reed-Solomon codes is carried out
using list decoding algorithms [1,6]. The list decoding
algorithms oﬀer enhanced performance over bounded
distance algorithms when the code rates are low.
3.3 Repetition codes
Repetition codes are used to construct the watermark
from the signature and they are expressed in the form of
(n, k, d). They are always used as (n, 1, n)where each code-
word is repeated n number of times. The repetition codes
are used as inner codes in the construction of the water-
mark. They are also used as outer codes in all cases. The
decoding of the repetition codes is always done using a
mean operation on the received codeword to distinguish
between a 0 or a 1.
3.4 Hamming codes
Hamming codes are linear block codes. For an integer
m > 1, we have the following representation for the binary
Hamming codes in the form (n, k, d) = (2m − 1, 2m−
1 − m,m).
For m = 3, we have (7, 4, 3) Hamming error correcting
codes. These Hamming codes encode 4 bits of data into
7 bit blocks (a Hamming code word). The extra 3 bits are
parity bits. Each of the 3 parity bits is parity for 3 of the 4
data bits, and no 2 parity bits are for the same 3 data bits.
All of the parity bits are even parity. The (7, 4, 3)Hamming
error correcting code can correct 1 error in each of the
Hamming codeword.
When we multiply the received codeword with the par-
ity check matrix we get the corresponding parity ranging
from 000 to 111. These three bits give us the error loca-
tion. 000 indicating that there were no errors in trans-
mission and the rest from 001 to 111 indicate the error
location in our seven bit received codeword. Here we can
correct one error according to t = (d − 1)/2	 as the
minimum Hamming distance between our code words is
7 − 4 = 3, we have 1 as the number of correctable errors.
Now we have the error location, we could simply ﬂip the
bit corresponding to the error location and the error will
be corrected. Then we discard the parity bits from posi-
tion one, two and four we have our received data words.
Hamming Codes are perfect 1 error correcting codes.
That is, any received word with at most one error will be
decoded correctly and the code has the smallest possible
size of any code that does this. The Hamming codes that
we used could correct 1 error in each codeword. There
was a need to test other types of codes which can cor-
rect more errors. We selected the BCH codes which are
explained in the following section.
3.5 Bose Chaudhuri Hocquenghem (BCH) codes
BCH codes are cyclic block codes such that for any posi-
tive integersm ≥ 3 and t with t ≤ 2m−1−1, there is a BCH
codes of length n = 2m − 1 which is capable of correcting
t error and has dimension k = n − m ∗ t.
Let C be a linear block code over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F of block
length n. C is called a cyclic code, if for every codeword
c = (c1, . . . , cn) from C, the word (cn, c1, . . . , cn−1) in Fn
obtained by a cyclic right shift of components is also a
codeword from C.
We have selected the BCH(15, 7, 5) and the
BCH(63, 16, 23) error correcting codes for the purpose of
our experimentation. The BCH(63, 16, 23) is in line with
our algorithm testing parameters since the size of our
initial matrix is 8 × 8 bits.
3.6 Reed-Solomon codes
Reed-Solomon codes [49,54] are q-ary [ n, k, d] error cor-
recting codes of length n, dimension k and Hamming
minimum distance d equal to n − k + 1. These codes
can decode in a unique way up to n−k2 errors, and there
exists the possibility to decode them beyond the classical
bounded radius n−k2 . Usually these codes are considered
over the Galois ﬁeld GF(pm) (for p a prime) and have
parameters [ pm − 1, pm − 1− 2t, 2t+ 1]. In particular the
case p = 2 is often considered for applications since in
that case any symbol of the code can be described withm
bits. It is also possible either by considering less coordi-
nates in their deﬁnition, either by shortening them, to con-
struct Reed-Solomon codes overGF(pm) with parameters
[ pm −1− s, pm −1−2t− s, 2t+1], which can be decoded
in the same way that non shortened Reed-Solomon
codes.
Reed-Solomon codes are particularly useful against
burst noise. This is illustrated in the following example.
Consider an (n, k, d) = (40, 11, 30) Reed-Solomon code
over GF(26), where each symbol is made up of m = 6
bits as shown in Figure 6. As d = 30 indicates that this
code can correct any t = 14 symbol error in a block
Figure 6 Reed-Solomon codes. Burst error performance of Reed-Solomon codes.
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of 40. Consider the presence of a burst of noise last-
ing 60 bits which disturbs 10 symbols as highlighted in
Figure 6. The Reed-Solomon (40, 11, 30) error correcting
codes can correct any 14 symbol errors using the bounded
distance decoding algorithm without regard to the type of
error induced by the attack . The code corrects by blocks
of 6 bits and replaces the whole symbol by the correct
one without regard to the number of bits corrupted in
the symbol, i.e., it treats an error of 1 bit in the sym-
bol in the same way as it treats an error of 6 bits of the
symbol—replacing them with the correct 6 bit symbol.
This gives the Reed-Solomon codes a tremendous burst
noise advantage over binary codes. In this example, if the
60 bits noise disturbance can occur in a random fashion
rather than as a contiguous burst, that could eﬀect many
more than 14 symbols which is beyond the capability of
the code.
In the watermarking channel, the errors, character-
ized by the diﬀerent attacks, occur in random or burst
manner. Depending on the placement of the watermark
in an image and the use of error correcting codes, the
robustness of the signature can be increased against the
attacks.
For Reed-Solomon codes the conventionally used,
bounded distance decoding algorithms correct up to t =
(n − k)/2	 symbol errors as shown in the above exam-
ple. Using list decoding, Sudan [1] and later Guruswami-
Sudan [6] showed that the error correcting capability of
Reed Solomon could be improved to tS = n −
√
2kn and
tGS = n −
√
nk respectively.
3.7 List decoding of Reed-Solomon codes
It is well known that for a linear code [ n, k, d]q over the
ﬁeld GF(q), of length n, dimension k and distance d, it
is possible to decode the code in a unique way up to a
number of errors: t =[ (d − 1)/2]. Now what happens if
the number of errors is greater than t? Clearly there will
always be cases where a unique decoding will not occur.
For instance if d is odd and a codeword c has weight d,
any element x of weight (d + 1)/2 (which support the
set of non zero coordinates) is included in the support of
c, will be at distance (d + 1)/2 of two codewords: x and
(0, 0, . . . , 0), which gives two possibilities for decoding.
Meanwhile if one considers a random element of weight
(d + 1)/2 the probability that such a situation occurs is
very unlikely. A closer look at probabilities leads to the
fact that in fact even for larger t (but with t bounded by a
certain bound, called the Johnson bound) the probability
of a random element to be incorrectly decoded is in fact
very small.
The idea of list decoding is that for t > (d − 1)/2 a list
decoding algorithm will output a list of codewords rather
than a unique codeword. List decoding was introduced by
Elias [55], but the ﬁrst usable algorithm for a family of
codes, the Reed Solomon codes, was proposed by Sudan
in [1], later the method was improved by Guruswami and
Sudan [6].
The list decoding method is a very powerful method
but it is slower than classical algorithms which decode
less errors. For usual context in coding theory the decod-
ing speed is a very important factor since one wants to
optimize communications speed, but there exist contexts
in which the use of such a decoding is not as important
since the use of the algorithm is only causal in the overall
process. This is for instance the case in cryptography and
in traitor tracing schemes [56] where list decoding algo-
rithms are used when one wants to search a corrupted
mark (which does not occur all the time).
The principle of the algorithm is a generalization of
the classical Welch-Berlekamp algorithm, the algorithm
works in two steps: ﬁrst construct a particular bivari-
ate polynomial Q(x, y) over GF(q) and then factorize it
for ﬁnding special factors. These factors lead to a list of
decoded codewords.
The ﬁrst algorithm by Sudan permits (for k/n < 1/3)
to decode up to n − √2kn errors rather than n/2 for
classical algorithms. This method is based on Lagrange
interpolation.
The list decoding algorithm of Sudan [1,57] is detailed
in the following steps
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3. Find all factors of Q(x, y) of the form (y − f (x)) with
degree (f (x)) < k.
4. A list of factors f (x) that satisfy the following is
obtained
Hd((f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn)), (r1, r2, . . . , rn)) ≤ tG
5. Calculate f (x) over the encoding elements to obtain
the corrected codeword (c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn).
The second method of Guruswami and Sudan [6,57]
permits to decode up to n − √kn errors, but is trickier
to use since it is based on Hermite bivariate interpolation
and on the notion of Hasse derivative.


















In practice the hard step of decoding is ﬁnding the poly-
nomial Q(x, y). It can be done in cubic complexity in an
elementary (but slow) way by the inversion of a matrix,
or also in quadratic complexity but with a more hard to
implement method [58].
The Guruswami-Sudan list decoding algorithm detailed
in [1,57] could be summarized in the following three steps
1. For a received word (r1, r2, r3, . . . , rn) and encoding
elements (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn) belonging to a Galois
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where h + u < s, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and s is a natural
number.
Qa,b = 0 if l > a or b > la where
la = s(n− tGS) − 1− a(k − 1) and l and s are the list
size and multiplicity factor [6,57] for the
Reed-Solomon code. Where
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2. Put Qj(x) =∑lju=0Qj,uxu and consequently
Q(x, y) =∑lj=0Qj(x)yj.
3. Find all factors of Q(x, y) of the form (y − f (x)) with
degree(f (x)) < k,and then calculate f (x) over the
encoding elements to obtain the corrected codeword
(c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn).
The performance of Guruswami-Sudan algorithm is
better than the algorithm proposed by Sudan when the
code rate R = k/n is high. When the code rate is very
low they have similar performance. The performance of
both the list decoding algorithms shows clear improve-
ment over the bounded distance (BD) algorithms when
the code rate is low. We exploit this property of the list
decoding algorithms to encode the signature in to the
watermark. The improvement of performance is shown in
Figure 7.
We select the Sudan’s algorithm for the purpose of
decoding as the code rate R < 1/3 for the watermarking
scheme presented in Section 2 [5] for a signature size of 64
bits and the actual performance gain by the Guruswami-
Sudan over the Sudan algorithm is not signiﬁcant. The
parameters used to demonstrate the performance of the
Reed-Solomon codes are RS (40, 11, 30), RS (127, 9, 119),
and RS (448, 8, 441) and the code rates for these three
cases are 0.275, 0.071, and 0.018 respectively. Therefore
it is useless to use the high complexity Guruswami-Sudan
algorithm as for the code rates are very low for the given
cases and Sudan algorithm has similar performance, spe-
cially for RS (127, 9, 119) and RS (448, 8, 441), as seen in
Figure 7.
According to the properties of the diﬀerent codes, we
are now going to study the integration of these tools in our
color watermarking process.
4 Tests and results
For the tests we have used 15 images of diﬀerent types
and sizes (256 × 256, 512 × 512, and 1024 × 1024). In
this article, we focus on the largest images 1024 × 1024
shown in Figure 8. Each image is marked with 5 diﬀerent
signatures where the signature size is 64 bits. This made
us independent of the signature and helped us to measure
Figure 7 List decoding. List decoding performance comparison.
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Figure 8 Test Images.
certain robustness. The attack types under study are JPEG
compression, noise, low pass ﬁlter, hue, saturation and
brightness attack. Then corresponding graphs show aver-
age performance of the error correcting codes, BER (bit
error rate) against the attack type for the diﬀerent image
sizes. Bit error rate (BER) is used to measure the perfor-
mance of the error correcting codes BER = BEBT , where BE
is the number of erroneous bits received for each attacks
and BT is the total number of bits of the signature.
In the following ﬁgures, the graphs represent the param-
eter of the attack on the x-axis and on the y-axis the bit
error rate is shown. The graphs show the average for each
of the tested image size and error correcting codes against
each of the attacks.
4.1 JPEG compression
Due to the lossy JPEG compression we lose the higher
frequency components which results in blurring of
the image. As the watermarking algorithm embeds the
watermark in middle frequencies, the attack does not
completely remove the watermark at low levels. Blurring
and blocking eﬀects can be noticed in attacked images
with a higher compression level causing random errors in
the watermark.
We tested our method against JPEG attack by starting
oﬀ the compression from a quality level of 1% to a qual-
ity level of 96% with a step size of 5% as one could see in
Figure 9a.
In general, we can say that our watermarking method is
robust against JPEG compression where the compression
level is up to 50%. If the compression level of the image
is reduced beyond 50% then the image is quite degraded.
This is so because the JPEG compression starts to com-
press middle frequencies where the watermark resides.
If the quality level is reduced beyond 50% then we
observe loss of high frequency information, artifacts on
subimage boundaries and localized stronger artifacts. The
loss of high frequency information has no eﬀect, but the
localized artifacts have inﬂuence to some wavelet coeﬃ-
cient values. Due to the relationship between the contents
of an image and the position of the artifacts, the eﬀects
of the errors induced by the JPEG compression on the
wavelet coeﬃcients are random in nature.
Given the random comportment of the errors induced
by the JPEG compression, the BCH codes show the best
performance in all cases of image size, with and without
the extra protection of repetition codes, and the Reed-
Solomon codes give the worst performance due to the
random nature of the attack.
As we have said, there is also a relationship between
the contents of an image and the attack applied. The
dependability of this relationship and the type of error cor-
recting codes used is also signiﬁcant. The test images have
diﬀerent distribution of frequency content. The water-
marking scheme uses these characteristics to insert the
watermark. The robustness of these images using Reed-
Solomon codes against JPEG compression is shown in
Figure 9b.
Figure 9 JPEG compression attack. (a) Comparison of coding schemes against JPEG compression for image size 1024 × 1024; (b) Comparison of
diﬀerent images for RS codes; (c) Comparison of diﬀerent images for repetition codes.
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The eﬀect of the use of the diﬀerent types of error cor-
recting codes and the relationship between the type of
image used for the JPEG compression attack could be
observed while considering repetition codes and Reed-
Solomon codes. Let us consider repetition codes for the
same images. In the results shown in Figure 9b,c we
can notice the diﬀerence in performance of the rep-
etition codes and Reed-Solomon codes for the same
images. It is observed that the repetition codes protect
the same images at higher compression levels than the
Reed-Solomon codes but with the same sensibility to the
characteristics of the image.
Notice the diﬀerence in robustness of a compression
factor of 40 for the image Bear and the image Plant
shown in Figure 8. This diﬀerence in performance for
the two images is due to their characteristics, the manner
in which watermarking scheme exploits these character-
istics to insert the watermark and how these locations
are eﬀected by the attack. The frequency contents of the
image Bear are generally high, very sensitive to the com-
pression scheme. Whereas the ﬁgure Plant has relatively
lower frequency content and has important discontinu-
ities. The watermarking scheme uses middle frequencies
to insert the watermark and the JPEG compression attack
will ﬁrst remove any high frequencies in an image, this
explains the observed results.
To conclude, the analysis of robustness against JPEG
compression using the diﬀerent families of error correct-
ing codes shows that the image play a very important
role for the overall robustness of the watermarking algo-
rithm, and also shows that diﬀerent error correcting codes
have diﬀerent performance against the diﬀerent attacks
for every type of image. We consider that Color water-
marking schemewith BCH codes is usually robust to JPEG
compression.
4.2 Additive white Gaussian noise
The type of noise that we introduce into the image is addi-
tive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). The insertion of the
noise or the attack is completely random in nature and
there are no bursts of noise. The x-axis in the Figure 10a
shows the signal to noise ratio (SNR) and the y-axis
shows the bit error rate. The AWGN is distributed uni-
formly through the image and due to the randomness of
the attack the wavelet coeﬃcients are eﬀected uniformly.
The diﬀerence in the performance of the Reed-Solomon
codes and the others is evident as all other codes except
the Reed-Solomon codes are more capable to correct the
random errors.
4.3 Low pass ﬁltering
The low pass ﬁlter gives a blurring eﬀect to an image as
it ﬁlters out high frequency components from the image.
The watermark is robust against low pass ﬁltering as it is
not embedded into high frequencies. The error correcting
codes perform equally well for the low pass ﬁlter attack,
the bit error rate is 0 (Figure 10b) except for some cases
of large ﬁlter dimensions (9 × 9) and no code protection.
This is because the low pass ﬁlter starts ﬁltering fre-
quencies where the watermark is embedded but the error
correcting codes provide enough robustness so that this
error remains negligible. This robustness against low pass
ﬁlter is a generic feature of transform domain watermark-
ing schemes as usually transform domain watermarking
schemes do not insert the mark in high frequencies.
One of the main objectives of this article is to highlight
the eﬀects of modiﬁcation of the color components for
watermarking schemes and provide eﬀective robustness
against color attacks. We will now discuss some of these
color attacks and eﬀective counter measures using error
correcting codes.
4.4 Hue
The term hue describes the distinct characteristics of
color that distinguishes red from yellow and yellow from
blue. These hues are largely dependent on the dominant
wavelength of light that is emitted or reﬂected from an
object. Hue is the angle between the color vector associ-
ated with the pixel and a color vector taken anywhere on
the plan orthogonal to grey axis and which sets the ref-
erence zero Hue angle. This reference Hue value is often
taken to represent the red color vector, so we decided
arbitrarily to associate the red color vector and gave it a
Figure 10 Noise and low pass ﬁlter attacks. Comparison of coding schemes against: (a) noise (AWGN) (b) low pass ﬁlter for image size
1024 × 1024.
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Figure 11 Hue, saturation, and value.
zero Hue value (Figure 11). Hue is the angle between this
reference color vector and the color vector.
The scheme is not very resistant against changes in hue
because they eﬀect directly the color vectors that we use
in the watermarking process.
In general, all the coding schemes except the Reed-
Solomon codes give almost the same results as the error
rates are beyond their error correcting capacity. To char-
acterize the noise introduced by hue modiﬁcation, we can
say that changes in hue aﬀect all coeﬃcients representing
a particular color similarly and this would have hue eﬀect
in blocks.
This is in accordance with the block design of Reed-
Solomon codes which help protect the watermark to a
certain limit. The progressive improvement of the perfor-
mance of Reed-Solomon codes could be seen in Figure 12,
where reasonable changes modulo 180◦ are correctable
when using RS(448, 8, 441). The little resistance to the
changes in hue is provided by list decoding of Reed-
Solomon codes as changes in hue eﬀect all the color
components at the same time, consequently eﬀecting
the wavelet coeﬃcients, where the watermark has been
inserted.
Even Reed-Solomon codes are not able to resist the hue
attack if the force of the attack is increased (the changes in
hue are increased) as the blocks of Reed-Solomon codes
and the blocking eﬀect of changes in hue do not cater for
exactly the same wavelet color vectors.
4.5 Saturation
Saturation is the measure of color intensity in an image,
the Saturation is the distance between the color vector and
the grey axis (Figure 11). The less saturated the image, the
more washed-out it appears until ﬁnally, when saturation
is at−100, the image becomes amonochrome or grayscale
image and as the saturation increases the colors become
more vivid until they no longer look real.
The negative saturation poses no problem to any of
our error correction schemes except for a value of −100
but then the image is just a grayscale image. Now the
image is desaturated and all the color planes have the same
values and there is no diﬀerence between the diﬀerent
color vectors. Therefore the watermarking algorithm is
not able to decode the watermark. When the image is not
completely desaturated then the diﬀerence between the
wavelet color coeﬃcients is changed in relative proportion
to the changes in saturation and the watermarking algo-
rithm is able to decode the signature without the help of
error correcting.
Figure 12 Comparison of coding schemes against hue for image size 1024× 1024.
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On the positive side, except the list decoding of Reed-
Solomon codes, the coding schemes start giving a sig-
niﬁcant number of errors when the change in saturation
exceeds a value of about 30.
As for the previous hue attack, the saturation attacks
has eﬀect in blocks. In fact, the saturation on the posi-
tive side might not eﬀect the watermark if the change in
saturation does not eﬀect the color vectors strongly. But
if the change in saturation eﬀects the color components
beyond a certain limit, then the error correcting codes
are not able to provide robustness for these high levels.
This is the case where the pixels values go out of bounds
after processing. To take care of the R, G, and B values
exceeding the bound, this problem is tackled by clipping
the out of boundary values to the bounds. Clipping the
values to the bounds create undesirable shift of hue and
as in the previous section aﬀect all coeﬃcients represent-
ing a particular color similarly and this would have eﬀect
in blocks. This is in accordance with the block design
of Reed-Solomon codes. The performance improvement
using the Reed-Solomon codes is evident in Figure 13a,
where the BER < 0.1. Furthermore if the image is satu-
rated beyond a value of 60, it ceases to have a commercial
value as natural images are not saturated to such values on
the positive side.
The saturation attack, like the other attacks, has depen-
dency on the contents of the image and the robustness
measure applied to protect the watermark. The BER
increase in Figure 13a for high saturation values is due to
the image Leaf and image Monkey (Figure 8) as shown in
Figure 13b and it is not attributed entirely to the incapabil-
ity of list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes to decode the
watermark for highly saturated images. For example, the
original image Leaf is highly saturated and the modiﬁca-
tion of the saturation is quickly associated with R, G, and
B values exceeding the bound.
4.6 Brightness
The brightness of a color measures the intensity of light
per unit area of its source. We consider that bright-
ness is the norm of the color’s orthogonal projection
vector on the grey axis (Figure 11). It is enough to say
that brightness runs from very dim (dark) to very bright
(dazzling).
Our scheme resists the modiﬁcation in brightness in the
negative side to the extent of −90, where the image is
hardly invisible. On the positive side at a value after 40
none of the schemes could correct the errors but then the
image is degraded to such an extent that it is no longer
useful.
The modiﬁcation of the Brightness distorts the satura-
tion as a side eﬀect and the eﬀect of saturation change is
more signiﬁcant when the change in luminance is impor-
tant. Contrary to the others attacks, it may be more diﬃ-
cult to fully characterize this transform. The attack impact
will depend on a signiﬁcant number of factors (the param-
eter of the modiﬁcation, the saturation value, the intensity
value). Furthermore, the modiﬁcation of the brightness
may be considered as a random degradation dependent on
the characteristics of the image.
In general, all the coding schemes except the Reed-
Solomon codes give almost the same results as the error
rates are beyond their error correcting capacity and give
better performance than RS code for large size images
(Figure 14a). Moreover, the response of individual water-
marked images is also dependent on the characteristics
of the image as shown in Figure 14b. For example, using
Reed-Solomon codes, the ﬁgure “Bear” has the same
robustness as for other error correcting codes, this image
is unsaturated. The rest of the images have diﬀerent
robustness.
The results and the special cases discussed in this
section show that the characteristics of the image, the
watermarking scheme, the use of error correcting codes
and the eﬀects of the attack all play a very important role
determining the robustness for watermarking schemes.
Each of these characteristics has to be considered sep-
arately and also the relationship between each of these
issues is to be considered while determining the robust-
ness performance of watermarking schemes.
On the whole, we can say that the strategy we pro-
pose based on wavelet domain and error correcting codes
(with judicious choices) perform well for the diﬀerent
attacks.
Figure 13 Saturation attack. (a) Comparison of coding schemes against saturation; (b) Comparison of diﬀerent images against saturation for
image size 1024 × 1024.
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Figure 14 Brightness attack. (a) Comparison of coding schemes against brightness; (b) Comparison of diﬀerent images against brightness for
image size 1024 × 1024.
5 Conclusion
It is general knowledge that no digital image watermark-
ing scheme is robust against all types of attacks. The
purpose of this article is to be able to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the error correcting codes with reference to each
attack type.
The ﬁrst contribution is to adapt the QIM principle to
vectorial case with a watermark insertion process based
upon moving one of the three color vectors (R, G, andB).
This process, associated with the Wavelet decomposition
is deﬁned in order to minimize the color distortion .
The second contribution concerns the investigation of
the performance capabilities of diﬀerent error correcting
schemes employed for a digital color image watermark-
ing application based on the discrete wavelet transform.
We have worked on improving the robustness of the sig-
nature with the help of four families of error correcting
codes. We have described and compared the eﬀect of
diﬀerent classes of codes against diﬀerent type of real
image attacks, we have included diﬀerent codes and the
list decoding scheme in a color watermarking complete
process. For this, we have analyzed the errors introduced
by diﬀerent attacks and highlighted the connection of a
particular attack with a particular error correcting scheme
in the context of our color wavelet algorithm.
The results shown in this article conﬁrm that the
approach of using error correcting codes as a tool to
enhance the robustness of watermarking schemes. Dur-
ing the course of this study, we observed that the use
of diﬀerent types of error correcting codes give diﬀerent
robustness to the inserted watermark. This robustness to
the diﬀerent types of attacks depends upon the underlying
characteristics of the image.
It was observed that the four diﬀerent families of error
correcting codes exhibit diﬀerent characteristics when
diﬀerent attacks are applied to diﬀerent watermarked
images. In general, the BCH(63, 16, 23) outperform the
other error correcting codes used to evaluate the bounded
distance algorithms but when the error rates are very high
then the repetition codes continue to give modest perfor-
mance. This is of no great advantage as the image is quite
degraded in such cases.
This property of the repetition codes helps in the con-
catenation model and they are always used as the outer
error correction codes. It was also observed that the
concatenation model used in the course of this study
is very useful in terms of reducing the error rate so
that the inner error correcting codes can correct the
errors at a lower error rate. We conclude that in gen-
eral the BCH(63, 16, 23) (using with the repetition codes
and the concatenation model) give us the best perfor-
mance against attacks which induce errors in a random
manner.
The list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes using Sudan’s
algorithm was used to further enhance the robustness of
the watermarking scheme. We obtain very good results
especially for codes with low rates. An important conse-
quence of using the method is that when the code rate








errors which means that the proportion of
potential errors tends to 1.
The list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes shows better
performance for color attacks, specially hue and satu-
ration, where the pixels values go out of bounds after
processing and have eﬀect in blocks. The performance
against noise and JPEG compression is not good because
of the complete and semi-random nature of the two
attacks, respectively. The low pass ﬁltering does not eﬀect
the watermark as the watermark is inserted in middle
frequencies and all error correcting schemes encounter
minimal errors even for the large ﬁlter size of 9× 9, which
signiﬁcantly degrades the quality of an image.
To conclude, we will once again underline the fact
that our discrete wavelet transform based color image
watermarking scheme is very useful itself to protect the
watermark. It uses middle frequencies and local image
characteristics; this makes it robust to a certain extent
against low pass ﬁlter attack and JPEG compression. The
error correcting codes add further robustness to the cases
where the scheme is not inherently robust, as shown
during the course of this article. Our results show that
some codes are better than others for diﬀerent types of
attacks. Each attack modiﬁes the image in a diﬀerent
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way depending on the characteristics of the image. The
error correcting codes can correct certain error types and
depending upon their own construction the error cor-
recting codes could be beneﬁcial in the case of burst or
random noise. Based on the above, it is inferred that
for a precise scenario and thus associated with a given
restricted set of attacks, we can choose the adapted error
correcting codes with our wavelet transform based color
image watermarking scheme.
In future study, we will study the invisibility issue of the
watermarking algorithm. The use of the image character-
istics have a very signiﬁcant role to play in determining
the robustness performance of a particular watermarking
scheme and the method used to enhance the robustness
or invisibility of the inserted watermark. The actual study
is dedicated to the eﬃcient insertion of the watermark
inside an image depending upon the characteristics of the
image, hence increasing the robustness and reducing the
degradation of image quality due to watermark insertion.
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